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EFFECTS OF THE CHANGING TREATMENT OF CAPITAL LOSSES
AND OF SHORT TERM TRANSACTIONS
The character of the allowance for capital losses is in many respects
an integral part of the tax treatment of capital gains. Any allowance
for capital losses means that the government stands ready to bear a
portion of the possible loss of a contemplated transaction, assuming
that the loser has other taxable income or capital gains from which
all or a portion of the loss may be deducted. The statutory loss
allowance, no less than the tax rate on gains, therefore enters into
the odds for any investor who can expect sufficient ordinary income
or capital gains from which the loss allowance can be deducted. And
the character of the loss allowance, like the effective tax rate, may
influence the timing of the formal realization of capital gains and
losses arising from investments previously made.
1 ALLOWANCES FOR CAPITAL LOSSES HAVE MODERATED THE DETER-
RENT INFLUENCES OF CAPITAL GAINS TAXES ON INCENTIVES TO
MAKE NEW AND LIQUIDATE OLD COMMITMENTS
The preferential tax treatment of capital gains has usually been
accompanied by a roughly corresponding or greater limitation upon
the allowance for capital losses. Great Britain and other countries
that exclude most types of capital gain from taxable income disallow
also any deduction from taxable income for capital losses of the
same types. In the United States since 1916 capital losses have
invariably been allowed in full up to the amount of the capital gains
of similar character or holding period, at least.' Limitations on
deductibility have been confined to net losses, i.e., the excess of
losses over gains. In 19 18-21, when capital gains were fully taxable
as ordinary income, capital losses were allowed in full against income
of any kind. When, in 1922-33, the maximum effective tax rate on
long term (over 2 years) capital gains was limited to 12½ percent,
1Despitethe full taxability of capital gains as ordinary income in 1913-17,
capital losses were completely disallowed in 1913-15, and were allowed only
up to the amount of capital gains in 1916-17.
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long term capital losses remained deductible in full at first, but in
1924-33 Congress limited the allowance to a maximum of a tax
credit of 12½ percent of the loss, paralleling the preferential tax
limit on long term capital gains. Short term capital losses meanwhile,
1922-33, were allowed in full against ordinary income, just as short
term gains were fully taxed.2 When in 1934-49 varying proportions
of long term capital gains were exempted from taxation, the same
proportions of long term losses were disallowed as deductions; and
when in 1938-49 maximum tax rates on capital gains substantially
lower than those on ordinary income were reestablished, the tax
credits for long term net losses were restricted to similar percentages
of the losses. Beyond such parallel treatment, however, the deducti-
bility of net capital losses from taxable income has been arbitrarily
limited at various times since 1934 to $2,000 or $1,000, or, in the
case of short term net losses, has at times been eliminated altogether.
Reasons forparalleltreatment of gains and losses
One reason for treating capital gains and losses in an at least
roughly parallel manner is that the two possess some of the same
peculiarities. Both commonly are from assets held longer than 1
year (or may be so defined for purposes of income taxation). If
treated as arising solely in the year of realization and subjected to
the regular progressive tax rate schedule, a long term capital gain
is taxed more heavily, and a long term capital loss yields a smaller
tax reduction, other things being equal, than if the gain and loss
were divided among the years during which the asset was held. As
far as this consideration justifies special tax treatment of capital gains,
it justifies a corresponding special treatment of capital losses. Simi-
larly, those who do not regard capital gains as adding commen-
surately, if at all, to the recipient's 'true' income or to his current
taxpaying ability must, for the same reasons, regard capital losses as
something less than full subtractions from 'true' income or current
taxpaying ability.
Another view that has exerted considerable practical influence
upon legislators regards those who report capital gains and losses as
constituting a single group whose members both enjoy the gains and
suffer the losses. In this view, the members of the group cannot
justly ask that their gains be granted preferential tax treatment but
2In1922-23 short term capital losses were not allowed against long term
capital gains, though they were deductible in full against other income; and
in 1932-33 short term losses on stocks and bonds were allowed only against
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their losses nevertheless be allowed without restriction. Equity
demands equal treatment of gains and losses.
In practice the policy of balancing a preferential tax treatment of
capital gains with a corresponding limitation upon the deductibility
of capital losses has highly unequal effects upon individual investors.
Those who lose their capital early are hurt immediately by limited
loss allowance but may never benefit from the liberal treatment of
gains. And all other investors whose losses exceed their gains can
be expected to derive small consolation from the knowledge that
the disallowance of part of their losses has been matched by the
equal exemption from taxation of the net gains of their more f or-
tunate fellow investors.
Nevertheless, before the investment is made, when the investor
is calculating the odds, a parallel tax treatment of capital gains and
losses tends to minimize the law's distortion of the odds and to be
'fair' or 'equal', in this sense, to each investor. If only half of any
net capital gain or loss is recognized for tax purposes, for example,
the risk of a disallowed loss is balanced against an equal chance for
a tax-exempt gain.
2 EVEN LIMITED LOSS ALLOWANCE IS OF GREAT VALUE IN REDUCING
DETERRENTS TO NEW COMMITMENTS AND TO REALIZATION
Under substantial tax rates the deductibility of capital losses is im-
portant in reducing risks even when it is limited to the amount of
capital gains reported by the investor in the same year, i.e., even
when net capital losses are completely disallowed.3 To an investor
who has already realized or can count upon subsequently realizing
equal or bigger capital gains during the taxable year, a provision
limiting the deductibility of a possible loss to the amount of gains
would be of little practical importance. The loss, if realized, would
be fully offset against gains otherwise taxable, and so qualify for
complete deductibility. Professional short term traders and specula-
In 1934-37, whenthestatutory or recognized gains and losses were varying
fractions of the actual ones,a $2,000 limiton theexcess of recognizedlosses
overrecognizedgains wasinforce.In 1938-41 net shorttermlosses were
completely disallowed against ordinary income but could be carried forward
to apply against short term gains of the succeeding year; there was no limit
on the allowance for net long term losses. In 1942-50 the excess of recognized
losses over recognized gains was deductible from ordinary income up to $1,000
or net income, whichever was smaller, and the balance could be carried
forward and deducted unhimitedly against capital gains and up to $1,000 or
net income, whichever was smaller, during each of the next 5years.184 CHAPTER7
tors are commonly in this position with respect to short term com-
mitments, and many other investors are frequently in a similar
position with respect to longer term investments, for they can choose
when to sell various marketable assets in which they have unrealized
profits. If a disallowed net capital loss is otherwise likely, an investor
may choose to sell another asset on which he will realize an off-
setting gain, thereby, in effect, being permitted to take this gain tax
free. He may repurchase the asset the same day yet be considered
to have realized his gain. Hence he can receive full allowance for his
capital loss without jeopardizing his position in the other invest-
ment. The saving of taxes that would otherwise be payable at some
time if he took the gain at all during his lifetime would be equivalent
to a reduction of the loss on the losing transaction.
Besides encouraging new commitments by reducing risks, an
allowance for capital losses encourages realization of gains and losses
from old commitments. Whenever an investor with unrealized capital
gains on other holdings incurs a capital loss he can realize his gains
tax free to the extent of the loss allowance. He has, therefore, a
motive for converting unrealized into realized gains. And whenever
an investor with unrealized capital losses realizes a capital gain he
has a motive to realize the former to the extent of his gain in order to
avoid future taxes on the latter.
3 LARGE INVESTORS CAN TAKE BETTER ADVANTAGE OF LOSS ALLOW-
ANCES THAN SMALL BUT THE USUAL LIMITATIONS ARE HARDER
ON THE LATTER
The large investor is likely to benefit more than the small from the
allowance for losses, whether or not the allowance is limited to the
amount of capital gains. If the law permits deduction of capital losses
from ordinary income, he is likely to have the advantage of a bigger
ordinary income against which to offset losses. With unrestricted
loss allowance, moreover, he may find it more feasible to reduce his
current income taxes to the utmost by formally realizing his capital
losses whenever they arise and postponing the realization of gains
until his death, when his properties are inherited and become sale-
able without capital gains taxation.
Severe limitations on the allowance for net capital losses, never-
theless, are likely to be harder on small investors. When no deduc-
tion from other income is allowed for net capital losses, for example,
the professional speculator and the investor who makes many com-
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equal, because the laws of chance give them more probability of
having some gains against which to offset losses. The small investor
is more likely than the big to have his capital wiped out early by a
succession of initial losses. The presumably wider variety of invest-
ments and the larger resources of the big investor give him more
flexibility to choose, with an eye to the maximum tax advantage, the
time to realize gains and losses. He is more likely to have other
holdings that have appreciated in market value, and to be in a better
position, therefore, to realize sufficient gains to give his losses full
deductibility. In short, limitations on loss allowance paralleling the
preferential treatment of capital gains are likely to be especially hard
on the small investor.
4 CHIEF AIMS OF SEVERE LIMITATIONS ON LOSS ALLOWANCES IN
RECENT YEARS: TO PREVENT EXCESSIVE TAX AVOIDANCE AND TO
MAINTAIN REVENUES
Since 1922 Congress has consistently limited the allowance for
capital losses more than it has granted preferences to capital gains.
The chief motives have been to maintain revenues and to prevent
excessive tax avoidance by individuals with big incomes through
sales and exchanges deliberately undertaken to reduce taxes. Wide
publicity was given in 193 0-34 to cases in which wealthy individuals
had established large net capital losses by selling securities to their
wives, children, or close friends, from whom they repurchased the
identical securities after 60 days.4 Several eminent New York bankers
testified before a Senate committee in 1933 that they had been able
greatly to reduce or to wipe out their liabilities for income tax in
this manner in 1929-30. Sales to controlled family corporations
and family trusts also permitted legal recognition of loss even though
an underlying continuity of ownership and control persisted. Coming
at the same time as public revelations that many well-known finan-
ciers had avoided full payment of taxes on their capital gains during
the booming 'twenties by using family corporations, trusts, and
foreign corporations as vehicles for the receipt of their gains, this
testimony aroused widespread resentment against the statutory
weaknesses that permitted such tax avoidance.
Opportunities to establish losses by wash sales to relatives, friends,
and family corporations were subsequently narrowed by new statu-
tory restrictions. But Congress concluded that even in the absence
Cf. Public Report 1455 (1934), 73d Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. 3, Ch.V,especially
citations of testimony in Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices before the
Committee on Banking and Currency.186 CHAPTER
of artificial arrangements large amounts of net capital losses were
being realized deliberately to reduce income taxes, without corre-
spondingly reducing the taxpayer's capacity to pay them. Opportuni-
ties for taking large capital losses without significantly altering the
amount or character of the investor's holdings were abundant and
nearly continuous during the long decline in the prices of securities
and other capital assets in the 1930's. Suppose, for example, a man
had invested $100,000 in a diversified list of stocks and bonds from
which he received $4,000 a year in dividends and interest. If, as part
of a general decline in the market, the market value of his portfolio
shrank one-half, he could sell out, thereby establishing for tax pur-
poses a capital loss of $50,000, and immediately use the proceeds
to purchase a similar, though not identical, list of securities, also
yielding an income of $4,000 a year. His investment position would
be essentially the same, yet he would be able to claim a deduction
from taxable income because of his $50,000 capital loss. If he
waited 60 days after seffing (now 30 days), he would have estab-
lished his capital loss even if he bought back the identical securities.
The opposite situation, as we noted, has often been cited in
support of proposals to exclude capital gains from taxable income.
The capital gains of an investor who purchases for $80,000 a port-
folio of securities yielding an annual income of $4,000 and, after a
rise in the market, sells the portfolio for $100,000 and with these
funds buys another but similar list of securities also yielding $4,000
a year, is not, the contention is, a true addition to income. The
investor's dividend and interest income remains $4,000 a year, and
his holdings of securities, though altered in detail, leave him in an
essentially unchanged investment position.
The correspondence in principle between the character of the
loss and of the gain in the examples just cited is clear, but Congress
preferred to limit the allowance for losses and reduce the taxation
of gains instead of excluding both gains and losses from the calcula-
tion of taxable income. On the one hand, it did not wish completely
to exempt from taxes the large amounts of real as contrasted to
nominal capital gains; that is, gains representing a true increase in
the wealth or purchasing power of the investor rather than a mere
reflection of a general rise in prices. When realized by sale, the
increase in the value of a farm from $10,000 to $1 million after oil
is discovered on it, and the increase in a stock's value from $40 to
$75 a share because of the added earning power resulting from rein-
vested earnings or expected from new products or contracts, exem-
plify such real gains. On the other hand, Congress did not wish theCAPITAL LOSSES AND SHORT TERM TRANSACTIONS 187
government's revenues to be highly vulnerable to investors' shrewd
exploitation of short run price declines and even to longer run
declines. Although the initiative is in their hands, many investors
find it convenient or necessary from time to time to realize gains
that are nominal in some degree, thereby subjecting themselves to
taxes on them. But whereas the taxation of gains discourages unnec-
essary realization of nominal gains, a full or liberal allowance for
capital losses encourages the taking of what we have termed nominal
losses. In other words, investors are given a tax incentive to minimize
their realization of nominal gains but to maximize their realization
of nominal losses.
In general, morever, the investor's discretionary control over the
timing of the realization of gains and losses, together with the desire
to maintain revenues, has probably been the most important factor
in influencing Congress to limit the recognition of net losses. It has
often permitted the investor to offset ordinary income and real
capital gains with nominal losses due to temporary but general price
movements in the security markets, and in other ways to whipsaw
the government's efforts to tax him. Tax lawyers, accountants, and
financial institutions encourage and aid the investor in such endeav-
ors. Toward the close of each calendar year most persons known
to possess sizeable security holdings are likely to receive reminders
from brokers, banks, attorneys, or accountants that a worth while
saving in taxes can be accomplished without risk or essential change
in investment position by appropriate shifts of securities with a
view to the realization of losses. It is less commonly pointed out that
this advantage will be only temporary if the taxpayer subsequently
sells the substitute investment. The cost or 'basis' of the latter will
be less than that of the original asset by approximately the amount
of loss previously reported. Hence the capital gain realized on the
new asset will be larger, or the capital loss, smaller, by the same
amount.
Even when the allowance for net losses is restricted, the investor's
discretionary control over timing gives him a decided advantage. To
a considerable degree, he can choose to avoid realizing his possible
gains when these would be heavily taxed and to establish his losses
in years when he would derive the largest tax advantage from them.
That is, the investor can often choose to realize losses in years when
his capital gains and other income are unusually large or when the
treatment of losses, in his opinion, is unusually and only temporarily
favorable, and to realize gains in years when his capital losses are
large or his other income small or when the tax treatment of gains188 CHAPTER7
is regarded as unusually favorable. The taxpayer does not have any
choice, however, with respect to losses from assets that become
worthless. Unless they are reported for the year in which the worth-
lessness ftrst becomes a fact they are not recognized.
While these reasons for limiting allowances for capital losses go
far to explain Congressional policy in this regard, they do not neces-
sarily justify it. The policy has doubtless had severely inequitable
effects upon many investors whose timing of purchases and sales was
not influenced by tax considerations. Further, by weighting the
tax-odds against the risk-taker, its general effect is to discourage
risky investment. The desire to maintain government revenues is
not a sufficient justification for doing so at the expense of losers as
against other taxpayers.
Capital losses, shOrt and long term, were allowed in full in
1917-21. The sole limitation on the deductibility of capital losses in
1922-31 was on long term net losses, the maximum allowance for
which was limited beginning in 1924 to 12½ percent.5 This limita-
tion corresponded with the ceiling tax rate of 12½ percent on long
term net gains, and was effective only for individuals with substantial
incomes. In 1932 and 1933, following large deductions for short
term losses suffered in the stock market, Congress eliminated all
allowance for net losses from stocks and bonds held 2 years or less,
although short term gains from them remained fully taxable as
ordinary income. In 1934-37 the law recognized the same propor-
tions of capital losses as of gains, varying with the length of time
the asset had been held, but imposed a limit of $2,000 on the amount
of statutory net losses that could be deducted from other income.
In 1938-41 this limit was removed, but all net losses on assets held
18 months or less were completely disallowed except that they could
be carried forward and deducted up to the amount of the short
term net gains in the succeeding year. Beginning in 1942 a flat limit
on the deductibility of net capital losses in any one year was reim-
posed, this time at $1,000, but the balance of net losses could be
carried forward for the following 5yearsand used in each up to the
amount of net capital gains plus $1,000.6
Except that in 1922-23 net losses on assets held 2 years or less, while allowed
in full against other income, were not allowed against long term capital gains.
If the net income was less than $1,000 in the year the net loss was incurred
or in any of the succeeding 5yearsin which a balance of net loss was carried
forward, the deductibility against ordinary income was limited to the amount
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5STATISTICSREVEAL NO CLOSE RELATION BETWEEN THE CHANGING
TAXTREATMENTOF CAPITAL LOSSES AND THE TOTALS REALIZED
Between 1917 and 1946, therefore, there were 5periodsof major
differences in the tax treatment of capital losses. The figures for the
5periodswhen the various provisions were in effect cannot safely
be compared in detail because of variations in tabulating methods
and in statutory definitions. For taxpayers with net incomes the
annual average of total net capital losses varied moderately, amount-
ing to$661miffionin 1917-21,$837million in 1922-33, $731
miffion in1934-37,$911 million in 1938-41, and$705miffion in
1942-46(Table 1). The annual totals of net capital losses varied far
more within each period of uniform tax treatment except one than
did the averages for the different periods. The range in 19 17-21 was
from$70 to $1,102 million; in 1922-33, from $213 to $1,815 mil-
lion; in 1934-37, from $693 to $772 million; in 1938-41, from
$642to $1,424 million; and in 1942-46,from $519 to $1,052mil-
lion. These figures indicate that the tax treatment of net capital losses
was not the major influence governing their amounts.
On the other hand, when the net capital losses of individuals
reporting statutory net deficits are added to the losses of those
reporting net incomes, the data, though too meagre for confident
inference, suggest that extreme limitations on the allowance for net
losses, such as were in force in 1934-37 and since 1942, may operate
to reduce loss realization. Figures on deficit returns are not available
before 1928. For the years since, the average annual net capital
losses of income and deficit returns combined were larger in the two
periods in which there was no absolute limit on the allowance,
1928-33 and 1938-41, than in the 2 periods in which the allowance
was rigidly limited, 1934-37 and 1942-46 (Table 1). Obscuring the
significance of this difference are the severe stock market declines in
the 2 periods when there was no ceiling on the allowance for losses.
Substantial net capital losses were nevertheless reported in
1934-37 and 1942-46, when their deductibility from other income
was stringently limited, and relatively small amounts were reported
in 1917-18 and 1922-23, when they were allowed in full. These facts
reflect the coercive force of nontax influences upon the timing of the
realization of capital losses. As already noted, investors on the
whole are likely to have less choice in timing the realization of their
capital losses than of their gains (Ch. 5, Sec. 4). Crises and depres-
sions, such as occurred in 1920-21, 1929-33, and 1937-38, force the
technical realization of capital losses upon numerous taxpayers190 CHAPTER7
through threatened and actual bankruptcies, margin calls, and other
imperious demands for liquidation; periods of prosperity and boom
do not equally coerce taxpayers to convert unrealized into realized
gains.
In one major respect, all our revenue acts since 1916 have been
similar: capital losses have been fully deductible up to the amount
of a taxpayer's capital gains, at least.7 In consequence, even when
the taxpayer could use his discretion about timing a loss, he has had
a strong motive to realize it as soon as he had offsetting gains or
other income from which it could be deducted. Postponing realiza-
tion could promise a larger tax advantage only if he was unable to
report sufficient offsetting gains or other income or if he expected
the statutory allowance for losses to be liberalized or believed the
same loss allowance would save him more in taxes in a future year
effective tax rates on his gains and other income 'might be
higher. Of such incentives to postponement, only two were likely
to be strong enough to outweigh an immediate saving in taxes: the
desire to avoid sacrificing a part of the tax-reducing value of a loss
by 'taking' the latter in a year when offsetting gains, together with
the allowable deduction from ordinary income, were less than the
loss, and the desire to hold an available offset against an as yet
unrealized large capital gain.
6 THE LAW TREATED LOSERS LESS LIBERALLY THAN GAINERS IN
1934-46, BUT THE NET RESULTS WERE FAVORABLE FOR UPPER
INCOME GROUPS AND UNFAVORABLE FOR LOWER
As previously indicated, even a parallel special treatment of capital
gains and losses may produce highly unequal results for different
individuals. Taxpayers who realize net capital gains are sure to be
taxed on them but those who incur net losses may not receive any
allowance for them. Even the same individual may be taxed on his
gains but not receive any allowance for his losses. Under the treat-
ment in effect in 1924-31, for example, an investor with no other
income who realized a net capital gain of $10,000 in all even-
numbered years and a net capital loss of equal amount in all odd-
numbered years, paid taxes on the gains of his good years and did
not receive a tax reduction for the losses of his bad years. An unlim-
ited power to carry forward the disallowed losses of one year to
future years would greatly diminish, though not entirely remove,
Except that short term net losses were at times not deductible from long
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this source of inequality, but an unlimited carry-forward has never
been in force.8 When the law permits only a small fixed amount of
capital losses to be deducted from other income, as in 1934-37
and since 1942, an otherwise parallel treatment of capital gains
and losses is likely to have even more unequal effects for different
individuals and for different classes of investors.
The tax treatment of capital gains and losses during 1934-37
resulted in excluding from tax somewhat more than a third of the
net capital gains realized by individuals with net incomes but in
disallowing more than three-fourths of their net losses. The excluded
net gains amounted to $1.1 biffion, the disallowed net losses to
almost twice as much (Table 24). While the law required that
identical percentages of gain and loss, varying with the number
of years the asset had been held, be excluded in calculating the
statutory amounts, the $2,000 limitation upon the deductibility of
net capital losses imposed a special disadvantage upon those incur-
ring such losses. (This disadvantage applied to net losses alone, not
to capital losses that were offset by capital gains.)
For the top income groups, the advantage of having portions of
their capital gains exempted from income tax strikingly outweighed
the disadvantage of having the same portions of their losses dis-
allowed, whereas the reverse was true for the other income groups.
Taxpayers with net incomes of $100,000 or more had aggregate net
gains about 5.9 times their aggregate net losses, whereas those with
smaller incomes had larger aggregate net losses than gains. The
exempted net gains of the former were about 3 times their disallowed
net losses in 1934-37, whereas the disallowed net losses of the latter
were about 2.6 times their exempted net gains (Table 24).
If the more complete figures available for 1936 are representative
of the other years, the advantage of the upper income groups was not
merely a reflection of the inclusion in this group of individuals with
large capital gains. Taxpayers whose net incomes in 1936 from
sources other than capital transactions amounted to $100,000 or
over, like those with statutory net incomes of that size, had more of
their capital gains than losses excluded from the tax base, whereas
the opposite was the case for other taxpayers (Table 68).
If the individual never again realized sufficient capital gains or other income
from which the accumulated net loss could be deducted, the carry-forward
would not benefit him, lithe carry-forward were supplemented by a carry-back
against the capital gains and other income of preceding years the more equal
treatment of complete averaging of income would be approximated.192 CHAPTER7
The $2,000 limit accounted for about a third of aggregate disal-
lowed net losses, and the statutory percentages, for two-thirds, in
1934-37
The statutory percentages accounted for the major part of the total
disallowed loss reported on all returns with statutory net incomes in
1934-37: 64 percent in 1934, 70 percent in 1935, 77 percent in
1936, and 50 percent in 1937. In each year a moderate and irregular
tendency existed for the $2,000 limit on the deductibility of net
losses to be responsible for an increasing proportion of the total
disallowed loss as we go up the income scale. In 1934, for example,
the application of the percentages accounted for two-thirds of the
disallowed loss of taxpayers with net incomes under $5,000, about
one-half for taxpayers with net incomes of $100,000 or over except
that the proportion for the group $300,000-500,000 was 66.7 per-
cent (Table 25). In 1937 the $2,000 limit accounted for about 41
percent of the disallowed loss of returns with net incomes under
$5,000, but was somewhat more important than the percentages in
determining disallowed loss for the income groups above $25,000.
In a few instances at high income levels, the application of the
percentages operated to increase the deductible net loss above the
loss actually realized. This could occur with certain combinations of
net gain on long term and net loss on short term transactions. For
example, a taxpayer who realized a net gain of $1,000 from an asset
held more than 10 years and a net loss of $1,500 from an asset
held 1 year or less had a statutory net loss of $1,200 by the applica-
tion of the statutory percentages, as compared with a realized net
loss of $500. In 1937 the percentages operated in this way on net
balance for all income groups between $100,000 and $500,000
(Table 25).
The $2,000 limit on the deductibility of net capital losses hurt lower
and middle income groups chiefly
While prevention of revenue loss and of inequity through tax avoid-
ance by individuals with big incomes was a main reason for the
adoption of the $2,000 limit on the allowance for net capital losses,
the income tax data do not supply a good measure of the degree
to which this objective was achieved. Of the $752 million of net
capital losses disallowed in 1934-37 by reason of the $2,000 limit,
35 percent was disallowed taxpayers with net incomes under $5,000,
and 76 percent was disallowed taxpayers with net incomes under
$25,000 (Table 25). In contrast, only 6 percent of the total was
accounted for by taxpayers with net incomes of $100,000 or over.CAPITAL LOSSES AND SHORT TERM TRANSACTIONS 193
It would appear, therefore, that the middle and lower income groups
were the main victims of the limitation. In the absence of any limit
on deductibility, however, members of the top income groups might
conceivably have chosen to realize additional losses by selling securi-
ties and other capital assets that had fallen in value below their book
costs. Despite the statistical results, therefore, the limitation may
have realized the objective of reducing opportunities for tax avoid-
ance by those with large incomes. But a much more generous loss
allowance, say $25,000, would have been of value primarily to
taxpayers with lower incomes.
Even unrestricted deductibility, though it would have offered some
major opportunities for tax saving for various individuals with
large incomes from ordinary sources, would doubtless have been of
most benefit in the aggregate to the middle and lower income groups.
Under all the special statutory treatments of net capital losses, the
medium and lower income groups have accounted for much the
largest part of the aggregate losses reported by individuals with net
incomes. Individuals with net incomes under $25,000 accounted for
55 percent of total net capital losses in 1926-33, 82.3 percent in
1934-37, 80.1 percent in 1938-41, and 88.2 percent in 1942-46.
On the other hand, those with net incomes in excess of $100,000
accounted for only 18.2 percent in 1926-33, 3.2 percent in 1934-37,
4 percent in 1938-41, and 2.5 percent in 1942-46 (Table 3).
Because of their divergent investment experience, the top income
groups continued to enjoy a net advantage, and the others, a net
disadvantage, from the tax treatment of capital gains and losses
in 1 938-41
The allowance for long term net losses was greatly liberalized in
1938 by the removal of the $2,000 limit on their deductibility. On
the other hand, net losses on assets held 18 months or less were
disallowed completely except that they could be carried over to
apply against short term gains of the succeeding year. At the same
time, as already noted, a tax credit of 15 percent of net losses on
assets held more than 24 months, and of 20 percent on those held
18-24 months, corresponding to the new ceiling rates on net capital
gains, had to be substituted for the new allowance of 66½ percent
of losses from assets held 18-24 months, and 50 percent of those
from longer held assets, whenever this would increase the tax.
Because of the changes in the statute and consequent changes in
tabulations, the figures for 193 8-41 are not closely comparable with
those for 1934-37 (Tables 22-4). Among other things, they under-194 CHAPTER7
state the total realized and the disallowed net losses because they
do not include net losses from assets held 18 months or less.
Largely reflecting the elimination of the $2,000 ceiling on the
deductibility of net losses, the proportion of long term net losses
disallowed was approximately the same as that of long term net
gains excluded from the tax, about 50 percent for all taxpayers with
net incomes. But the aggregate dollar amount of long term net losses
disallowed was about 1.5 times the total net gains exempted, because
total long term losses exceeded total long term gains by this propor-
tion for all taxpayers with net incomes (Tables 8 and 20).
As in 1934-37, individuals with incomes of $100,000 or over
and those with smaller incomes had quite different experiences, in
the aggregate. The net gains of the former greatly exceeded their net
losses,9 $921 million vs. $143 million, whereas the net losses of the
latter exceeded their net gains, $3,501 million vs. $2,223 million.
In consequence, the partial disallowance of net capital losses and the
corresponding exemption of equal percentages of net capital gains
had the effect of accentuating the good fortune of the former and
the misfortune of the latter, as groups. The disallowed long term
net losses of taxpayers with net incomes under $100,000 were
more than twice their exempted net gains, while the exempted net
gains of those with net incomes of $100,000 or more were over 6
times their disallowed long term net losses (Table 24). These figures
slightly understate the effective loss disallowance of the upper income
groups in 1938-41 because they do not take account of the provision
that the tax reduction resulting from a net capital loss could not
exceed 15 percent of the loss from assets held longer than 24 months
or 20 percent of that from assets held 18-24 months.
Heavy loss realization in 1938-41 does not seem to have been due
primarily to removal of $2,000 limit
Net capital losses reported by individuals with net incomes in the 4
years after the removal of the $2,000 limit on loss allowance were
substantially heavier than in the preceding 4 years. Their long and
short term losses together amounted to $2,925 million in 1934-37,
their long term losses alone to $3,494 million in 193 8-41, exclusive
of $149 million of losses on depreciable property used in the tax-
payer's business as well as of short term losses which were com-
pletely disallowed.
The year 1941 was noteworthy because the total net capital losses
Exclusive of short term net losses, which were completely disallowed in
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reported, even though they excluded short term net losses, exceeded
those of all years except 1929-33.
The behavior of the stock market, in conjunction with the grow-
ing expectation that the United States would enter the war, seems to
be the primary explanation for the heavy loss realization of 1938-4 1.
Between the end of 1934 and the end of 1936 stock prices rose
markedly, Standard and Poor's index of 90 stocks (monthly average
of daily prices) moving from 73.5 in December 1934 to 135.5 in
December 1936. A sharp decline followed, the index sinking to
87.5 in December 1937. After small and short-lived recovery move-
ments in 1938 and 1939, the down trend was resumed in 1940. A
sharp increase in trading on the New York Stock Exchange accom-
panied an acceleration of the decline in the months immediately
preceding and in the weeks following the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor on December 7, 1941. The December 1941 index of 69.5
was lower than any monthly average since April 1935.
The removal of the $2,000 limit on loss allowance could be
expected to stimulate loss realization but there is no decisive evidence
that it was the major influence. The big increase in net losses
occurred in 1941, the fourth year following the repeal of the limita-
tion, rather than in 1938, 1939, or 1940 (Chart 7 and Table 1).
Approximately 40 percent of the total net losses reported by those
with net incomes and 36 percent of the total net losses reported for
the 4 years were realized in 1941, while the losses reported for 1938,
1939, and 1940, even after allowing for the exclusion of short term
losses, were either smaller or only moderately higher than those of
the 3 years immediately preceding.
Nevertheless, a qualification of the foregoing observation is in
order. As far as the timing of the realization of losses is in the
discretion of the taxpayer, he can be expected not to take them in
years when his ordinary income and capital gains are small, such as
1938-40. The removal of the $2,000 limit on loss allowance could
be expected to become a stronger stimulus to loss realization after
taxpayers' incomes from other sources had recovered, as happened
in 1941.
A minor additional stimulus in 1938-41 was a further revision
in the treatment of loss by which net losses realized on the sale,
exchange, or involuntary conversion of buildings and other depreci-
able assets used in the taxpayer's trade or business were made fully
deductible, whereas in 1934-37 they had been treated like any other
capital losses. The rearmament program in 1940 and 1941 stimu-196 CHAPTER7
lated many transfers of such properties in which losses that had long
before taken place in the market values of the properties were
'realized'. Of the $3,643 miffion of net losses realized by individuals
with net incomes in 1938-41, $149 million was of this character.
The long term net losses of taxpayers with net incomes of
$100,000 or over were about 50 percent larger in 1938-41 than their
short and long term net losses together in 1934-37, while the per-
centage increase in the losses of other taxpayers was less than half as
large. The omission from the 1938-41 figures of losses from assets
held 18 months or less, which might have increased more for other
taxpayers than for those with net incomes of $100,000 or over,
impairs, but does not wholly invalidate, the basis for the inference
that the removal of the $2,000 limit caused a relatively bigger
increase in loss realization by upper than by lower income groups.
In any event, the net losses of individuals with incomes of $100,000
and over constituted less than 4 percent of the total net losses of
all individuals reporting net incomes in 1938-41.
5 year carryover of net capital losses since 1942 mitigates effect of
$1,000 limit on annual deductibility from other income
The maximum allowance of $1,000 in any year for net capital losses,
in force since 1942, is the smallest since 1917. But the fact that net
capital losses not deducted in one year can be carried forward for
the succeeding 5 years and used in full in any of them to offset net
capital gains and up to $1,000 of other income removes much of
the seeming harshness of the limitation. Indeed, in some respects
the new treatment is more generous than any preceding one. Many
who suffered large net capital losses in 1929-31 and 1938-41 en-
joyed relatively little tax relief from the absence of a ceiling on the
deductibility of net capital losses from ordinary income, for their
net capital losses greatly exceeded their ordinary income and their
unallowed losses could not be carried forward to future years. Under
the new treatment taxpayers who sustain heavy capital losses rela-
tively to their ordinary income can expect to obtain a fuller allow-
ance for them because they can carry forward their disallowed losses
for 5 years. Taxpayers who die soon after incurring large losses or
lose substantially all their capital may suffer heavily from the small
immediate allowance for losses yet derive no advantage from the
carryforward provision. But for active speculators and investors the
long period for which net losses can be carried forward improves
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sustained in any year will eventually be fully offset against the capital
gains and ordinary income of other years.
Another respect in which the new treatment is more generous is
that short term gains and losses may be used without restriction
to offset statutory long term gains and losses, and vice versa, instead
of being partly or wholly segregated. Half of realized gains and losses
from capital assets held longer than 6 months and the full amounts
of shorter term gains and losses are taken into account. The algebraic
sum of the statutory amounts constitutes the statutory net capital
gain or loss. After up to $1,000 of a statutory net capital loss has
been deducted from ordinary income, the balance is carried forward
as a short term net loss to the succeeding 5 years. Because $1 of
short term capital losses offsets $2 of long term gains, a taxpayer may
report a statutory net capital loss even when his transactions actually
result in an excess of capital gains.
The new treatment went into force too recently for reliable com-
prehensive measures of its effects to be reflected in the income tax
figures yet available. In 1943-46, $962 million of prior years' net
capital loss was carried over on individual income tax returns. The
entire amount did not result in current tax reductions mainly because
some of it was reported on returns without enough offsetting capital
gains. If the present provisions are continued, the aggregate loss
carryover is likely in a few years to become very substantial. While
it will doubtless operate to reduce tax revenues from capital gains in
boom years, it will do so precisely because it will allow taxpayers to
offset their gains in such years by losses incurred in the preceding
5years.
7EFFECTSOF THE TAX TREATMENT OF SHORT TERM GAINS
During the Congressional committee hearings on the Revenue Revi-
sion of 1942 opponents of heavy taxation of capital gains concen-
trated their attack chiefly upon the tax treatment of short term
gains. This was understandable, for gains from assets held 18 months
or less were then taxed in full as ordinary income, whereas half the
gain from assets held more than 2 years was exempt or, at the option
of the taxpayer, the whole was taxed a flat 15 percent, however large
his other income.'0
It was argued that only the lower income groups could afford to
'take' short term gains under the prevailing treatment, and that
Of gains from assets held 18-24 months, a third was excluded from tax or,
at the option of the taxpayer, the whole was taxed a flat 20 percent.198 CHAPTER 7
short term trading and tax revenues would increase tremendously if
Congress would abolish the distinction between short and long term
gains, disallow net capital losses completely, and segregate all capital
gains from other income and tax them at a low flat rate such as 10
percent.'1 In support of these contentions reference was made to the
extremely small volume to which stock market trading had fallen
and to the small or negative revenues obtained by the Treasury from
the tax treatment of capital gains and losses in recent years: a net
revenue loss from this source was estimated to have been experi-
enced in 1940 and 1941 (Table 90). What is the evidence?
The income tax statistics clearly reveal that the progressive in-
creases in tax rates in the 193 0's and early '40's were accompanied,
in a general way, by a pronounced decline in the relative importance
of short term gains at all the main income levels (Table 13). For
example, short term gains (capital gains from assets held 2 years
or less) averaged 51 percent of the total capital gains of individuals
with net incomes of $50,000-100,000 in 1926-29, 41 percent in
1930-33, and slightly under 40 percent in 1934-37. In 1938-41 and
in 1942-46, the average proportion fell to 15 and 4 percent, respec-
tively, reflecting, in part, the reduction of the short term period first
to 18 months, then to 6 months.
The bare statement of the effective tax rates on short term gains
after 1931, particularly for individuals with large incomes, creates
a strong presumption that they exercised a restraining influence upon
short term trading (Table 87). By 1941 the rates were such that a
married man with 2 children paid 48 percent of the next dollar of
short term gains if his net income was otherwise $25,000, 59 percent
if $50,000, 68 percent if $100,000, and 78 percent if $1 miffion.
In the face of such rates —theywere advanced further in 1942-44
—onemight wonder that any material amount of short term gains
continued to be realized at all by individuals with sizeable incomes.
Yet the Treasury Department, in opposing the contention that high
tax rates were responsible for the relatively small importance of short
term gains taken by upper income groups, showed that individuals
with net incomes over $25,000 accounted for more than twice as
large a fraction of the total short term gains as of total net income in
each of the 3 years
Outstanding importance of stock market activity
While the rising tax rates doubtless contributed to the declining
12Revenue Revision of 1942, Hearings, Ways and Means Committee, pp. 910,
922, 928, 983, 1656.
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importance of short term capital gains in 1934-46, other forces,
notably the movements of the stock market, exerted a strong and
perhaps the dominant influence. A large fraction of the total decline
took place between 1936 and 1937 when the stock market fell
violently but tax rates remained constant (Table 8). In fact, tax
rates were not raised for incomes under $50,000 until 1940, and the
only advance between 1934 and 1940 for incomes above $50,000
occurred in 1936 when short term gains not only maintained their
relative importance but their absolute amount rose to the highest
level since 1929. We have already called attention (Ch. 5, Sec. 7,
Chart 18, Table 8) to the' close relation between fluctuations in
stock prices and in short term net capital gains and losses.
The continued contraction in 193 8-46 in the relative importance
of short term gains at nearly all income levels would appear to be
attributable largely to the declining trend of stock prices and the
small volume of trading during much of the period and to the reduc-
tion of the holding period by changes in the statute, first to 18 months,
then to 6 months. From early 1937 until 1943 no recovery that
lasted as long as a year or that approached the high prices of 1936
occurred in the average of industrial stock prices. With stock market
advances relatively limited in duration and extent, the opportunities
for short term capital gains were fewer.'3
On the other hand, the Treasury's testimony that individuals with
net incomes above $25,000 accounted for more than twice as large
a fraction of total short term gains as of total net income in 193 8-40
does not prove that the high tax rates were not discouraging upper
income individuals from short term transactions. The figures cited
may be explained in considerable measure by the operations of pro-
fessional short term traders and speculators, including both those
legally designated as dealers and others not so classified. Their trans-
actions account for a considerable proportion of total short term
trading in securities. Data made available in recent years by the
Securities and Exchange Commission indicate that stock exchange
members alone, among such professionals, are commonly respon-
sible for about a fourth of all the shares traded on the New York
Stock and Curb Exchanges. Most transactions that stock exchange
members conduct for their own account are generally believed to be
short term. In addition to members of exchanges, many persons
Short selling during periods of decline can in theory yield gains as large as
from buying during periods of advance, but in practice, short selling is
undertaken to a much smaller extent, even among professionals and semi-
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devote all or a part of their time to short term speculation and may
be properly classified as part- or full-time professionals.
Professional speculators are less likely than casual traders and
investors to be deterred from short term commitments by high but
nondiscriminatory taxes on their gains. They are practicing a pro-
fession or exercising a personal skill, primarily, rather than investing
their capital. For this reason their gains are commonly taxed as
ordinary income even by countries, such as Great Britain, that
exempt similar profits when realized by ordinary investors. Their
skill in discounting and otherwise exploiting short term movements
in prices constitutes their intellectual capital, so to speak, and can
yield them a return only if used. If they diverted their energies to
other fields —inwhich, presumably, they would be less qualified —
theywould face equally high tax rates. Despite the higher tax costs
of short term than of longer term trading, their funds are more
profitably employed in numerous very short transactions, such as
those characteristic of some floor traders on the New York Stock
Exchange who close out each day's commitments before the end of
the day's trading.
The deductibility of short term losses from short term gains, even
in the absence of more generous allowances for losses, greatly les-
sens the deterrent influence of high tax rates upon the disposition of
professionals to take the risks involved in their operations. Their
superior knowledge of the market and the large number of their
transactions make it reasonable for them to expect a net balance of
gains over losses on their trading as a whole. The high tax rate on
the possible gain from any single contemplated transaction is offset
in considerable degree by the equally high tax-reducing power of
the possible loss, for a loss will be fully deductible from the taxable
gains of previous and future transactions within the taxable year.
For the professional a 50 percent tax rate, for example, means that
the government will not only take half of the possible gain from a
contemplated transaction but also stands ready to absorb half the
possible loss.14
Some short and medium term transactions are adversely affected
The foregoing offsets to the restraining influence of high tax rates
upon short term capital transactions apply with much less force to
occasional traders and speculators. Those who enter into short term
Thepractical effects of the tax treatment of capital losses is discussed further
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transactions only infrequently are likely to be more sensitive to high
tax rates than professionals for two reasons:
First, they usually lack a backlog of short term gains realized dur-
ing the taxable year from whièh a short term loss on a contemplated
transaction would be deductible; nor, as previously pointed out, can
they be as confident as professionals that they will realize capital
gains in future years against which they can offset an excess of losses
carried forward from the current year. Short term capital losses have
not been deductible from ordinary income to more than an extremely
small extent since 1931 (see note 3). Unlike the professional, there-
fore, they are not likely to be in the position in which the govern-
ment, by reducing the income taxes otherwise payable on their gains,
stands ready to absorb substantially the same fraction of the pos-
sible loss on a contemplated transaction as of the possible gain. In
consequence, high tax rates may well dissuade the occasional short
term trader or speculator from a particular transaction because the
prospective gain after taxes does not appear to compensate fully for
the risk of capital loss.
Second, such investors, because their skill and information are
less specialized for exploiting short term changes, are likely to be
more attracted than professionals by the possibilities of reducing
their taxes by delaying liquidation if the statute discriminates sub-
stantially in favor of longer term gains.
Large capital gains arise from short and medium term promotion
efforts, such as the assembling of the constituent members of a
merger, of adjoining parcels of real estate that are saleable at a
higher figure under common than under separate ownership, and
the organization of new enterprises with the deliberate intention of
seeking buyers for them as soon as they are well launched. Some-
times the men who launch such ventures have little choice when to
'take' their gains; at other times they have considerable flexibility.
If delay in seffing significantly enhances the risks, as when large sums
must be tied up and the outcome is sensitive to changes in business
conditions, or when options to purchase the needed properties can
be had only for short periods and the promoters lack the resources
to take up the options unless they can sell the properties simultane-
ously, the possibility of reducing taxes by delaying liquidation will
be of little influence. In such situations high tax rates on short term
gains will doubtless prevent some transactions that would take place
under lower rates, because the prospective gain after taxes does not
seem to compensate fully for the risk of loss. But if a moderate delay202 CHAPTER 7
incompleting the transaction will not increase risk or expense much,
a significant difference between the rates applicable to shorter and
longer term gains will give investors a strong motive to postpone
realization.
In the Revenue Acts of 1942-49 Congress was more responsive
to these considerations than it had ever been before. In extending the
preferential tax treatment of capital gains to those from assets held
less than a year, Congress departed from one of the most widely
accepted equitable grounds for differentiating between capital gains
and ordinary income: the ground that under a steeply graduated
system of tax rates it is unfair to tax a capital gain arising over sev-
eral years as the income of the single year in which it is realized. The
reduction to 6 months doubtless diminished the artificial incentive
that had operated under previous Acts to delay some sales a year or
more and to inhibit some purchases. Nevertheless the new provision
encouraged many who had formerly been resigned to the ordinary
tax rates on their short term gains to face the merely moderate delay
now required in the technical consummation of such transactions to
make their gains eligible for the large concession in tax rates.
The short period of required holding also stimulated the use of
various artificial expedients for extending legal ownership of an
asset beyond the 6 months even though the substantial equivalent of
a sale had been made. For example, a man who wanted to sell 1,000
shares of United States Steel Corporation common stock at $70 a
share after buying them only a month before at $65 a share, and yet
to treat his $5,000 profit as a long term capital gain, would retain his
own shares, for the time being, and sell another 1,000 shares he did
not own, directing his broker to borrow the latter from some holder
and deliver them to the purchaser. When the 6 months holding period
had elapsed, he would close out his short position by delivering his
original shares. A provision designed to close the short sale loophole
was included in the Revenue Act of 1950. In real estate substantially
similar results can be achieved, though with more risk. A seller post-
pones actual sale but gives an option, for which he exacts a heavy
advance payment, exercisable on the day following the expiration of
his 6 month ownership. Also used with the same effect is the device
of entering into a sales contract but fixing the date for the actual
transfer of title beyond the 6 month period.'5 When the required
holding period for a long term capital gain was 1 or 2 years, such
expedients were riskier and less attractive.
'5J. K. Lasser, Your Income Tax, 1948, p.118.